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Abstract
This article explores some aspects of money as a social relation. Starting from Polanyi, it
explores the nature of money as a non-commodity, real commodity, quasi-commodity, and
fictitious commodity. The development of credit-debt relations is important in the last respect,
especially in market economies where money in the form of coins and banknotes plays a
minor role. This argument is developed through some key concepts from Marx concerning
money as a fetishised and contradictory social relation, especially his crucial distinction,
absent from Polanyi, between money as money and money as capital, each with its own form
of fetishism. Attention then turns to Minsky’s work on Ponzi finance and what one might
describe as cycles of the expansion of easy credit and the scramble for hard cash. This
analysis is re-contextualised in terms of financialisation and finance-dominated accumulation,
which promote securitisation and the autonomisation of credit money, interest-bearing capital.
The article ends with brief reflections on the role of easy credit and hard cash in the surprising
survival of neo-liberal economic and political regimes since the North Atlantic Financial Crisis
became evident.
Keywords
Marxism, money, credit, fictitious capital, commodity, debt
Introduction
Although the title of this first issue of Finance and Society is ‘hard cash’, ‘hard cash’ (in the
sense of circulating coins and banknotes) has long been insignificant in the overall operation
of modern capitalism. Money in the form of credit matters far more and relaxes the need for
hard cash. However, major financial crises can be caused by easy credit and this, in turn, leads
to a scramble for hard cash – or at least more credible forms of credit. When public credit is
used to rescue too-big-to-fail private sector debtors, this can lead to austerity politics that
imposes a politics of hard cash in hard times. These themes organise the present contribution,
Finance and Society
2015, 1(1): 20-37
© The Author(s)
10.2218/finsoc.v1i1.1369
Article
21 Finance and Society 1(1)
which focuses on the nature of money, credit, and debt relations, and their role in capital
accumulation and public finance. The main argument is that money is not a thing but a
fetishised social relation with the potential to generate economic, financial, and fiscal crises.
More precisely, it is a not a single social relation but a complex and contradictory ensemble of
social relations. It can circulate as a non-commodity, a fictitious commodity, a quasi-
commodity, and a real commodity; and, in these (and other) regards, it has diverse forms and
functions. Of special significance are the tensions between money as money and money as
capital and, in regard to public finance, between private credit and state fiat money. Thus an
adequate account of money should consider four interrelated moments of the money, credit,
and capital forms: (1) the functions of money; (2) the hierarchy of money forms; (3) the tension
between ‘national currency’ and world money, and its reflection in a changing currency
pyramid; and (4) the role of credit-debt relations in generating and/or mediating crisis-
tendencies in capitalist social formations. While these complex and contradictory features
underpin the abstract possibility of economic crises in the capitalist mode of production, their
actual forms of appearance and consequences depend on the particular assemblage of social
relations in a given capitalist formation. To address these issues I first draw on Karl Polanyi,
then turn to Karl Marx, note some lessons from Hyman Minsky about financial instability, and
finally relate these reflections to the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC).  
Fictitious commodities
Karl Polanyi (1982: 33) defined the economy in its substantive sense as “an instituted process
of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-
satisfying material means”. It need not involve (and for millennia did not involve) a significant
economic role for money.1 Polanyi was less concerned in how production was organised than
in how products were distributed. He identified four main principles: (1) householding based
on autarkic production to satisfy the needs of a largely self-sufficient unit such as a family,
settlement, monastery, or manor; (2) reciprocity among similarly patterned or organised
groupings (e.g., segmentary kinship groups); (3) redistribution through an allocative centre
linked to a political regime; and (4) exchange mediated through price-making markets in a
disembedded and potentially self-regulating economy (Polanyi, 1957: 47-53; 1977: 34-47;
1982: 35). On this basis, he noted that economic activities in pre-capitalist formations were
not undertaken mainly for ‘economic’ motives, i.e., for monetary gain or for fear of going
hungry for lack of sufficiently remunerative employment (Polanyi, 1977: 51-2). Rather, they
were embedded in social activities and institutions for which other motives and/or social
purposes were primary. With the rise of market economies, however, economic activities have
become increasingly dominated by profit-oriented, market-mediated activities.
Polanyi criticised the ‘economistic fallacy’ that assimilates the properties and dynamics of
non-capitalist economies to those of market economies. A similar fallacy occurs with the
assimilation of fictitious commodities in market economies to real commodities (cf.
Christophers, 2011). Indeed, one of Polanyi’s most important contributions to critical social
science was his insistence that land, labour, and money were not real commodities. He argued
that land is the natural environment of human beings, labour is simply human activity, and
money is just a unit of account. Even where they acquire a price, they are either not produced
at all (e.g., land is a free gift of nature) or, if their production requires human activity (e.g.,
baking bread, making tally sticks), this activity need not be motivated by the hope of pecuniary
gain. Matters change with the rise of the (capitalist) market economy. This not only relies on
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the principle of exchange but also generalises exchange relations to all elements of industry,
including land, labour, and money (Polanyi, 1977: 71). While Polanyi (1957: 72) acknowledges
that all three elements are “absolutely vital parts” of the market economy, he adds that “[t]he
postulate that they are produced for sale is emphatically untrue”. They are fictitious
commodities. Yet “it is with the help of this fiction that the actual markets for labour, land and
money are organized” (Polanyi, 1957: 72). It also legitimates the idea that each factor of
production is entitled to its own share of the total income and/or wealth of society. So “there
was a market price for the use of labor power, called wages, and a market price for the use of
land, called rent” (Polanyi, 1977: 10). For money, Polanyi argues, the price is the payment of
interest. On this point, matters are, as we shall see, a bit more complex than he suggests. But
we can certainly agree that most forms of money have a price (or prices) expressed in the
mystified, mystifying forms of interest rates and exchange rates, and of capitalised discounted
future earnings.
Marx anticipated this analysis in his ‘trinity formula’, which signifies how surplus-value is
distributed as revenue among three reified factors of production (capital, land, labour).
Further, in contrast to Polanyi, who stayed at the level of surface appearances of ‘market
prices’ for fictitious commodities, Marx distinguished profit-generating capital (which obtained
profits of enterprise) from interest-bearing capital (which received interest) and, more
importantly, entered the ‘secrete abode of production’ to establish that all four revenue forms
derived from the surplus-value created in the circuits of productive capital. In classical and
vulgar political economy and lay perception alike, the three ‘market prices’ (Polanyi) or
three/four forms of revenue (Marx) were attributed to the inherent properties of distinct
factors of production independently of the process of valorisation of capital in the circuits of
productive capital. While these may be illusory, insane categories (as Marx puts it), they have
real effects on the movement and relations of money, credit, and capital and, hence, on the
distribution of social wealth. For example, as de Brunhoff (1998: 182) observes about interest
as the cost of money, “this irrational price is also a factor in the rationalization of individual
capitalist practices”. This is because “[i]t serves industrial and mercantile capitalists as a
prerequisite and a factor in the calculation of their operation” (Marx, 1967c: 368). At the same
time it disguises the real mechanisms involved in valorisation and capital accumulation (Marx,
1967c: 814-31).
Treating the historical development of prices and the associated processes of price
formation for land, labour, and money as a wholly natural, fully rational process (or
progression) in human development leads to the fallacious and fetishistic belief, criticised by
Marx, that economic value arises from the immanent, eternal qualities of things rather than
from contingent, historically specific social relations. For Polanyi, this development requires
the dis-embedding of exchange relations from non-market relations that previously limited and
governed their operation and their subsequent re-embedding in a self-regulating market
society.
 
Self-regulation implies that all production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such
sales. Accordingly, markets exist for all elements of industry, not only for goods (always including services)
but also for labor, land, and money, their prices being called respectively commodity prices, wages, rent and
interest. The very terms indicate that prices form incomes: interest is the price for the use of money and
forms the income of those who are in the position to provide it; rent is the price for the use of land and
forms the income of whose who supply it; wages are the price for the use of labor power, and form the
income of those who sell it; commodity prices, finally, contribute to the incomes of those who sell their
entrepreneurial services, the income called profit being actually the difference between two sets of prices,
the price of the goods produced and their costs, i.e., the price of the goods necessary to produce them. If
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these conditions are fulfilled [in a fully functioning market society], all incomes will derive from sales on the
market, and incomes will be just sufficient to buy all the goods produced. (Marx 1977: 69)
 
However, according to Polanyi, if this threefold (fictitious) commodification goes too far, it will
provoke resistance to the market economy from a wide range of social forces adversely
affected thereby. He emphasises the tendential disjunction between the logic of the market
and the reproduction (renewal) requirements of nature and of labour-power alike, and also
explores the effects of dissociating the circulation of money from the requirements of
economic exchange for the satisfaction of human needs. This uncoupling, argues Polanyi,
generates such powerful contradictions and crisis-tendencies in market economies that
‘society’ eventually fights back against their environmentally and socially destructive effects.
This invites us to consider whether another Great Transformation will result from ‘society’
fighting back as Polanyi might have anticipated in the face of the current ‘triple crisis’
(environmental, social, and financial), or whether its outcome will instead confirm Karl
Deutsch’s (1973: 111) aphorism that power is the ability not to have to learn from one’s
mistakes.
Further reflections on commodification
This section develops the concept of fictitious commodity and the next section explores its
relevance to monetary relations. To frame the discussion, I distinguish four aspects of the
uneven movement of land, labour, and money from non-commodities into fictitious
commodities. First, Marx and Polanyi argue that land (or nature), labour-power, and money are
not inherently commodities. As non-commodities, they comprise raw nature, human creativity,
and natural (or symbolic) tokens of exchange respectively. There is no problem in seeing raw
nature as a non-commodity in this regard – it comprises the natural world prior to its
appropriation and transformation in and through human labour. Human creativity is also
unproblematic – it comprises the innate or learnt capacities of the human species considered
individually and collectively to perform useful labour. Even when labour-power has acquired a
commodity form (a process that occurs very late in human evolution), it is still reproduced in
significant measure through a heterogeneous ensemble of non-market institutions and
practices. Lastly, as Polanyi (1977: 62-73) shows from historical and anthropological records,
tokens should not be considered as commodities when they are exchanged in equivalencies
set outside the market mechanism. Moreover, regardless of the substantive nature of money
tokens (natural goods, products such as coin or bullion, or fiduciary symbols without real
value), the monetary system in which they circulate cannot be operated solely for profit without
regard to other considerations. On the contrary, the very economic functionality of monies
depends critically on personal and impersonal trust as well as extra-economic institutions and
sanctions.
Second, we can distinguish a simple commodity from a capitalist commodity. A simple
commodity is a product (a good or service) that is offered for sale – perhaps with only surplus
beyond the immediate needs of the producers being put up for sale rather than the entire
production being produced in order to sell it. Goods and services offered for sale can arise
from peasant, petty commodity, state production, cooperative production, or social enterprise
as well as capitalist production. What distinguishes a capitalist commodity from other kinds is
that it is produced in a labour process that is subject to capitalist competition. This creates
pressures to reduce the socially necessary labour-time involved in its production and the
socially necessary turnover time involved in realising the surplus-value that it embodies. In
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turn this generates a dynamic relation between the organisation of production and the
commodity character of the products being produced.
Third, on this basis, a fictitious commodity has the form of a commodity (can be bought
and sold) but is not produced in order to be sold. It already exists as a use-value before it
acquires the form of an exchange-value (e.g., raw nature) or it is produced as a use-value
before being appropriated and offered for sale (e.g., human artefacts originating in a
substantive, socially embedded economy). This concept is important because analysing land,
money, and labour-power as if they were simple and/or capitalist commodities would obscure
the conditions under which they enter the market economy, get transformed therein, and so
contribute to the production of goods and services for sale. In this sense, a fictitious
commodity belongs to the broader spectrum of quasi-commodities that have a price but
otherwise fail to meet one or more of the criteria for a full commodity. A full commodity for
Schaniel and Neale (1999: 96) is one that it is produced in factory like ways for sale on a
commercial market. I would add that a full capitalist commodity is one where production is
subordinated to capitalist competition at all stages in production and distribution to reduce
socially necessary labour and turnover times.
Thus, as fictitious commodities, land, labour, and money would comprise: (1) land that
has been enclosed and appropriated and then sold or rented in a private commercial
transaction with its price reflecting its productive potential and/or market demand; (2) the
capacity to perform useful labour reproduced outside the market economy and entering the
labour-market from outside in return for a wage; and (3) money as a marketable store of value
and medium of exchange, with competing commodity monies (e.g., gold, silver), fiduciary
monies (tokens, paper money, bank credits, fiat money), or tradable currencies (e.g., dollars,
euros, yen). In each case, what is crucial to their status as fictitious commodities is that they
are not produced in order to be sold but have entered into exchange relations because
markets in land, labour-power, and monetary tokens have been established. They could also
be redistributed in other ways, e.g., territorial conquest, enslavement, requisition or
confiscation, direct or indirect reciprocity, and so on.
Fourth, treating land, labour, and money as if they were commodities could lead in due
course to their transformation into one or more types of quasi-commodity as each becomes
more closely integrated into the cash nexus of market relations. At stake here are the ways in
which economic agents engage in formal, rational action to increase the exchange-value of
these fictitious commodities, i.e., their price as opposed to their value, through forms of
‘investment’ that correspond to each so-called factor of production. Examples of this include:
investments of capital and labour-power to improve ‘land’ (reflected in changes in absolute
and differential rent); efforts to increase skill levels or re-skill labour-power (considered as
marketable ‘human capital’) and/or to increase its scarcity (e.g., through artificial barriers to
labour market entry); and actions to ensure the credibility of money by linking it to real assets
(e.g., the recovery from hyper-inflation in the Weimar Republic thanks to the backing of the
new German mark through another fictitious commodity, land values). The resulting integration
of land, labour, and money into the circuits of capital and their subjection to the competitive
pressures of capital accumulation reinforces (and gives a material basis to) the ‘economistic
fallacy’ insofar as they become quasi-commodities open to rational calculation and actions to
increase the corresponding revenue streams, i.e., rents, wages, and interest.
Fifth, in this context, a further step in commodification would come through the power of
abstraction inherent in the extension of capitalist social relations. Thus 'land' could be
securitised in terms of future flows of absolute and differential rent (e.g., shares in real estate
investment trusts); money could be traded in futures markets and increasingly rarefied
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derivative markets. In these respects, fictitious or quasi-commodities can be transformed into
fictive capital, that is, into tradable commodities whose price depends on calculation about
discounted future revenues. In this sense they can be assimilated to the category of interest-
bearing capital as one form of money as property rather than money as functioning capital
(see below). An analogous process occurs in relation to labour-power insofar as the logic of
capital reduces concrete useful labour to abstract social labour, i.e., leads to the evaluation of
labour-power in terms of its contribution to (potential) surplus-value validated through the sale
of capitalist commodities (whose value to the capitalist resides in their exchange-value and
not their use-value) and not in terms of the specific qualities of the labour-power that is
expended in a particular labour-process. This kind of abstraction also occurs theoretically in
neo-classical economics, in real terms in institutionalised calculation about future earnings
streams (e.g., legal compensation or insurance systems that compensate workers for lost
income), and, increasingly, practically, in workers’ own calculations about the returns to
‘investment’ in their own ‘human capital’ as they become self-responsible (indeed, neo-liberal,
self-responsibilised) ‘entrepreneurial’ subjects who seek to maximise their discounted life-time
earnings.
Marx on money and capital
I have now defined non-commodities, simple commodities, capitalist commodities, quasi-
commodities, and fictive capital, and considered their relevance to land, labour-power, and
money. They can also be applied to the question of whether knowledge can be considered in
Polanyian terms as a fourth fictitious commodity (Jessop, 2007). Here, however, I focus on the
nature of money in these terms and what follows theoretically and practically from integrating
Marx’s successively introduced distinctions between money as money, money as functioning
capital, and capital in its role as property rather than functioning capital. This poses important
questions about the forms and functions of money, their respective inherent crisis potentials,
and their changing hierarchical relations. There is neither space nor time here to develop all of
the implications of Marx’s distinctions and, accordingly, I focus on the issue of whether money
is best seen in Polanyian terms as an inherently fictitious commodity.2
Marx studied the history of money to establish a benchmark to assess the historical
specificity of the forms and functions of money and credit relations in the capitalist mode of
production. While several monetary functions and categories are long established (for
example, money, credit, usury), they are all transformed by capitalist development (Marx,
1967a: 112, 527; 1967c: 325-37; 1972: 468-70, 485-92). In his discussion of money in A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and, later, in Capital I, Marx started with its
function as a medium of exchange in simple circulation (as the counterpart to commodities in
a commodity-money-commodity or C-M-C transaction) and then added more functions to the
analysis of money as money (see Table 1). In the opening chapters of these books, however,
Marx had not introduced the concept of money as capital. When he did so, even the functions
of money as money identified in earlier chapters are modified as he develops the distinctive
features of money as functioning capital and, later still, of capital as property (especially in the
form of interest-bearing capital). The crucial extensions concerned how the evolution and
operation of credit (in its different forms) modify the circuits of capital. Specifically, credit
reduces the need for profit-producing capital to hold monetary reserves, lowers the socially
necessary turnover time of capital, and changes the temporalities of the circuits of capital.
Marx takes the analysis even further by introducing fictitious money (credit money),
commodity-dealing, money-dealing, interest-bearing, and share-dealing capital, the
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intermediary role of banks in the circuits of capital, and fictitious capital (Marx, 1967c: 267-
322). Overall, he shows that credit relations (especially bank deposits) increasingly replace
money (cf. Ingham 2004: 107-43) as the fundamental category for analysing the contradictory
unity and crisis-prone dynamic of total social capital.
As Marx moves from the functions of money in simple commodity circulation (where he
assumes, for the sake of his opening argument, that money is a real commodity) to its forms
and functions in a fully developed capitalist economic formation, he makes three crucial
conceptual moves. First, he seeks to show that, in a fully developed capitalist system, money
takes the form of increasingly complex forms of credit. Second, he distinguishes (1) real
commodities, real money, and real capital from (2) fictitious commodities, fictitious money,
and fictitious capital. And, third, he distinguishes money as functioning capital from interest-
bearing capital as property (on the second and third developments, see Table 2).
Unsurprisingly, given his distinctive logical-historical method, these categories are
interconnected both conceptually and in their historical movement.
In this regard money is a representation of value (and/or of credit-debt relations) and it
can also function as capital, either as the most general expression of capital in the abstract
vis-à-vis specific forms of capital and/or as a money commodity (for example, gold) or, again as
a fictitious commodity, tradable against other commodities (including other national monies in
currency markets). Likewise, while Marx initially assumed that money was a real commodity
(that is, the raw material of the money commodity was produced in a capitalist labour process
and transformed into coins and bullion), this assumption was relaxed as he explored other
forms and functions of money. Indeed, he argued that the expansion of capitalist social
relations required that gold no longer be used in domestic circulation (Marx, 1967c: 517).
In particular, for Marx, when money is transformed into functioning capital, it mediates
the core social relation of capitalism, that between capital and wage labour. Indeed, money as
capital expresses the power of capital to organise and control labour-power in production.
The labour process has a dual character: it involves both the appropriation and
transformation of nature and the valorisation of labour-power. Money’s role as functioning
capital reinforces the transition from social production based on householding and/or political
redistribution and/or simple exchange relations (Polanyi, 1957) into a capitalist economy in
which private and public credit and banking relations increasingly replace real and/or paper
money as the basis of accumulation (Marx, 1967a-c; 1969). This development moves society
beyond credit-money that is advanced to finance consumption (usury) and/or state activities
(public debt) to the functioning of credit-money as capital. Theoretically, this underlines the
need for analytical categories specific to the circulation of money as capital and its various
forms. Further conceptual elaboration is required by the rise of fictitious capital and its status
as property. In this regard it differs from functioning capital, that is, capital that is employed
directly in production or circulation (see Table 2)
This leads Marx to stress the duality of money as both a real commodity and a fictitious
commodity, and its dual foundation in the social relations of commodity production and in
social relations of trust. This poses the question of the respective roles of money as a real
commodity and as a fictitious commodity in performing the functions of money as money and
money as capital. Marx analyses metallic and non-metallic money as complementary
counterparts, “united through the inherent contradiction between the need of capital to
expand indefinitely and the need for money to be universalizable exchange value, i.e. bound to
real value production and its realization in trade” (Krul, 2010: 5). In short, the duality of money
implies major tensions, potential contradictions, and crisis-potentials that are expressed in the
overall dynamic of capital accumulation and public finance.
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First, considered as a real commodity, money emerges spontaneously from the logic of
commodity circulation. In this context, its value is determined by the socially necessary labour
time involved in its production (Marx, 1967a: 99-100; see also Stemmet, 1996). Likewise, its
price is overdetermined by demand for the money commodity and the dynamic of absolute and
differential rent involved in gold and silver production in panning and mining sites with
different unit costs (Marx, 1967b; 1969). Together these constitute the value-space of real
money, i.e., the production of the money commodity and its hoarding or circulation as real
money.
Table 1. Marx on the functions of money. Source: Author's compilation, based in part on Marx (1967a,
1969, 1970, 1972); modified to distinguish MH more clearly from MH(K) and to identify MMI.
However, if the supply of metallic money does not keep pace with the actual (let alone
potential) production of commodities, then the self-valorisation of capital (its expanded
reproduction) will be limited. As this gap is normal given capital’s appetite for boundless
expansion, capital detaches the supply of money from its metallic base by resorting to credit
and fiat monies. In these circumstances, the raw material of real money becomes little more
than the commodity capital of its specialised producers to be exchanged for other
commodities against payment in non-commodity money (MMC). The money commodity may
continue as part of the money capital of banks, central banks, or states (MMH) and, in the
form of bullion, plays a key role, alongside central bank monies (notably international reserve
currencies, with or without real monetary backing in the form of bullion) in the functioning of
world money (WM).
In contrast with bullion or other forms of commodity money, different quantities of credit
and fiat money do not meaningfully embody different amounts of labour-time. It involves no
more labour-time to print a high- than a low-denomination banknote and little more to create a
billion- than million-dollar security. In short, credit and fiat money do not embody value.
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Nonetheless they do represent or reflect value in the sense that they comprise claims on
social wealth insofar as this takes the form of an immense accumulation of commodities
(Marx, 1967a). Their acceptability as money depends on relations of trust based on accepted
banking principles and/or state guarantees (Krätke, 2005). Moreover, given the hierarchy of
money forms (see Table 3), state authority replaces the value-space as the ground of money’s
acceptability (Park, 2010: 8). The precise relations among private bank credit, central bank
credit, and state fiat money vary historically as well as within and across national states and
the world market (see below on currency pyramids). Nonetheless the distinction between
central bank credit money and state fiat money is crucial to Marx’s analysis. The state makes
fiat money acceptable (validates it) because it can be used to pay taxes (cf. Marx, 1967a: 528-
32). Yet the state’s role in detaching money from a metallic base is “fundamentally
constrained and limited by the inherent requirement for maintaining the quantity [and
circulation] of [non-commodity] money at a level that corresponds to the dynamics of capital
accumulation” (Park, 2010: 17). This is the basis of the monetarist critique of the state’s
debasement of the national currency as well as of liberal and neo-liberal demands for central
bank independence. More generally, the distinction between credit and fiat money is crucial to
Marx’s analysis of the contradictions, dilemmas, and crises of the forms and functions of
money in capitalist social formations (cf. Krul, 2010: 15)
Table 2. Marxian categories for the analysis of money, credit, and capital. Source: Author's compilation,
based in part on Marx.
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Interest-bearing capital is the most fetish-like form of money because interest makes it
appear that capital, not labour-power, creates surplus value, rather than interest being a
deduction from value created in production. This has several consequences analysed by,
among others, Polanyi and Marx. For Polanyi, it leads to growing indebtedness and social
alienation and, sooner or later, to the ‘fight back’ of society. For Marx, it changes the dynamics
of class conflict because the rate of profit now forms an antithesis not with wage labour but
with the rate of interest (Marx, 1967c: 370-90). This leads to conflicts between fractions of
capital, especially between profit-generating capital and interest-bearing capital. This is
particularly acute when interest-bearing capital is dissociated from the real production and
realisation of value in the metamorphosis of profit-generating capital (e.g., in funding the
purchase of fixed capital or providing trade credit). This dissociation can occur in the short- to
medium-term when private credit expansion is directed to speculation and Ponzi finance,
shadow banking expands, there is increasing reliance on leverage unrelated to the real
movement of value, and prudential state controls are weak or absent. But the real movement
of capital will sooner or later re-impose itself.
According to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, unusually long periods of relatively
stable growth encourage false optimism. This leads economic actors to borrow excessively and
to pay inflated prices for assets. Prudent investors who had hitherto engaged only in hedging
finance (in other words, who expected to meet all their debt obligations, i.e., interest and
principal, from reliable cash flows) become less risk-averse and/or new investors are seduced
to enter financial markets using borrowed money. This is the stage of easy credit that sustains
speculative finance in which interest payments can be met from cash flow but capital
repayments now depend on asset appreciation – with the result that, if economic movements
do not turn out as anticipated, speculative borrowers may have to take fresh loans to repay the
original loan. A third stage, marked by yet easier credit based on Ponzi finance, emerges when
even the repayment of interest depends on continuing asset price inflation that enables Ponzi
borrowers to refinance a debt whose eventual repayment is always being postponed. Over the
course of a cycle, huge portfolios of financial instruments are accumulated and levered and an
increasing proportion of these portfolios are based on Ponzi finance. Minsky (1992) added
that, over the course of a financial cycle (from hedging through speculative to Ponzi finance),
financial institutions, which also become less risk averse, engage in financial innovation to get
round regulations and prudential controls intended to prevent speculative frenzies because
they expect the boom to last.
A Minsky moment is the point in a business and/or credit cycle when over-indebted
investors are forced to sell good assets to repay their loans, causing sharp declines in financial
markets and hikes in the demand for cash. This leads in turn to a liquidity and even solvency
crisis, which can force central bankers to extend credit (Minsky, 1975; 1982; 1986; 1995).
The result is a one-sided sellers’ market and market collapse – sometimes called a ‘Minsky
meltdown’ – unless bankers or other economic actors come to the rescue. It is in this context
that there is a scramble for ‘hard cash’ or, at least, more credible forms of credit backed by
more credit-worthy institutions with strong reserves. Or, as Marx expressed it in Capital III:
In times of a squeeze, when credit contracts or ceases entirely, money suddenly stands as the only means
of payment and true existence of value in absolute opposition to other commodities. Hence the universal
depreciation of commodities, the difficulty or even impossibility of transforming them into money, i.e., into
their own purely fantastic form. ... A depreciation of credit-money (not to mention, incidentally, a purely
imaginary loss of its character as money) would unsettle all existing relations. Therefore, the value of
commodities is sacrificed for the purpose of safeguarding the fantastic and independent existence of this
value in money. As money-value, it is secure only as long as money is secure. For a few millions in money,
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many millions in commodities must therefore be sacrificed. This is inevitable under capitalist production
and constitutes one of its beauties. (Marx, 1967c: 649)
 
Thus Minsky cycles end in a pro-cyclical flight to safety, “a violent scramble for means of
payment” (Marx, 1981: 621), a ‘dash for hard cash’, which some call a Minsky moment.3 This
threatens a downward spiral of debt-default-deflation. This dynamic can be understood in
terms of a shift in the role of money as capital from functioning capital towards capital as
property. In Minsky’s analysis, the role of hedging in the expansion of economic activities can
be seen as one aspect of money as functioning capital. In contrast, in speculative and Ponzi
finance, money operates in the guise of capital as property, i.e., as loan-bearing capital. Marx
also suggested that the advance of credit is critical to the expanded reproduction of capital
(serving to pre-validate investment and production – Minsky’s hedging role – but vulnerable
for the same reason to ruptures in the C-M-C and M-C-M’ circuits). He added that a period of
growth facilitated in this way encourages further expansion of credit-debt relations. However,
an increasing volume of credit-debt also makes the economy more vulnerable, that is,
“oversensitive” to the eventual downturn (Marx, 1981: 706). The mechanisms involved in this
downward spiral are related to the profit-oriented, market-mediated operations of the capitalist
mode of production and, in this context, to the hierarchical relation among money forms (see
also Rasmus, 2010).
The hierarchy of money forms and currency pyramids
This hierarchy facilitates the displacement and deferral of contradictions in the capital relation
in general and in money forms and functions in particular. We see this in central banks’ role as
lender of last resort in national contexts and in the role of state fiat money in bailing out
private banks and guaranteeing central bank debt (thanks to state’s taxing capacities and,
where relevant, money-issuing powers). That there are limits to such displacement-deferral
mechanisms has been demonstrated once again in the NAFC in the growing disproportions
among: (1) the explosion of fictitious money and fictitious capital; (2) the expansion of the
‘real’ economy on which these fictitious forms are claims; and (3) state capacities to issue fiat
money and tax their populations to absorb ‘toxic’ debt, which is the (im)polite name for what
Marx termed ‘excess credit’, rather than using other capacities to prevent its development or
ensure its devalorisation. It is these disproportions that, coupled with the power of financial
capital to shape national, European, and supranational state policy, that have transformed a
crisis of ‘excess credit’ into a crisis of public and sovereign debt. This crisis has provided, in its
turn, the fisco-financial and ideological basis for a reinvigorated neo-liberal assault on the
(welfare) state in the name of austerity. This assault is a significant indicator of the power of
finance in an era marked by the rise of finance-dominated accumulation (see also Jessop,
2013a; Lapavitsas, 2013).
More generally, although credit and fiat money enable capital to escape the limit imposed
by commodity money (‘hard cash’) on expanding production, it re-emerges at a world level,
even in the absence of Ponzi schemes. For, there is no world state or legal authority to set a
price numéraire as a unit of account or commensuration, and to authorise fiat money to
ensure the acceptability of non-commodity money (Krul, 2010; Park, 2010). This is already
implicit in Marx’s discussion of world money (bullion) and his remarks on the flight to gold
when other forms of money – including fiat money backed by even the previously most
creditworthy state – lose credibility.
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Table 3. The hierarchy of money forms. Source: Author's compilation, partly based on Marx.
In this light, let us turn to the nature of world money. The hierarchy of money forms presented
in Table 3 (above) has a physical commodity at its base and summit – respectively commodity
money and bullion. Further, while other forms of money had to develop so that the limits to
capitalist expansion set by commodity money could be broken, this limit could re-emerge at
the level of the world market because there is insufficient bullion in the world to validate the
expansion of credit and there is no lender in the last resort or world state to guarantee the
validity of credit.
But this logic may not hold if some monetary functions in the world market can be
secured without a world state. We can explore this through the notion of a currency pyramid.
Michel Aglietta identified a tension between the inherent plurality (pluralité) of national
currencies and the necessary uniqueness (unicité) of world money. Since the full range of
money functions could not be secured through bullion and, absent a world state that could
lend credibility to a true world money, a partial, provisional, and unstable solution could be to
adopt as world money the currency of the hegemonic or dominant state, where one exists
(Aglietta, 1987). This may be viable in situations where the hegemonic currency is convertible
with gold (for example, the Bretton Woods gold-dollar standard), but is vulnerable to Triffin’s
dilemma. This is the problem faced by reserve currency issuers in pursuing domestic monetary
policy goals while meeting other countries’ demand for reserve currency (Triffin, 1961).
Parallel reasoning led Susan Strange to a more nuanced account of the currency pyramid
in which the circulation of national currencies and their potential as world money had different
social bases. She defined this pyramid in terms of the balance of market forces and state
power in shaping the role of currencies in national, regional, or world markets (Strange, 1971a;
1971b). However, while Strange argued that market forces selected the top currency, its
issuing state also sustains it through its state capacities, including hard and soft power abroad
as well as domestic measures to maintain the competitiveness of domestic and/or overseas
investments. In practice, of course, currencies can combine features of the first three forms,
depending on geo-economic and geo-political factors and forces. For example, while the USD is
both a top and master currency, the Euro is both a master currency (linked to German
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mercantilism) and a negotiated currency (linked to a subset of European member states and
tied to a political project) (see Lapavitsas, 2012).
The currency pyramid is significant in terms of the asymmetrical organisation of the world
market, whether the latter is seen in terms of a logic of territorial expansion or in terms of the
logic of a space of flows (see Table 4). Different currencies are differently situated in this
regard. In the absence of a world money (or, at least, in the case of bullion, a world money that
exists in sufficient quantity to perform the functions of money on a world scale), and in the
absence of a world state (or, at least, an imperial state secure in its global hegemony), the top
currency plays a crucial but contradictory role in the integration of the world market, especially
when the top currency is central to the development of finance-dominated accumulation (and
hence an important factor of crisis-generation) and also serves as a safe haven in the flight to
quality as the crisis erupts and intensifies. The crisis in the Eurozone and the absence of
conditions for an effective challenge from the Yen or Renminbi as alternative top currencies
mean that the USD remains the pre-eminent form of ’world money’, even as it is also
implicated in the generation of the financial crisis.
Table 4. The currency pyramid. Source: Author's compilation, based in part on Strange (1971a; 1971b).
Table 5. Money and derivatives. Source: Author's compilation, based largely on Bryan and Rafferty (2006).
33 Finance and Society 1(1)
A brief digression on derivatives
Most forms of money lack intrinsic value. This is especially true of interest-bearing capital and,
above all, derivatives as they currently operate in the era of finance-dominated accumulation.
As Carchedi (2011) notes:
 
[T]he basic object of … transactions [in interest-bearing capital] is a representation of debt rather than of
value. It engages in transformations from a representation of value (for example, money) into a
representation of debt (bonds, derivatives, etc.), from a representation of debt into a different form of
representation of debt (from mortgages into mortgage-backed securities), or from a representation of debt
into a representation of value (the sale of a mortgage). These representations of debt are called by Marx
fictitious capital.
 
Just as there are inherent constraints on the state’s ability to create fiat money before
monetary crises emerge, so there are limits to banks’ ability to continue to create credit before
monetary and credit crises arise. This can be seen in the development of securitisation and,
especially, the rise of derivatives and their massive expansion. For, as Marx anticipated (not
only in his remarks on the world market but also in his remarks on fictitious capital and the
contradiction between capital as value in motion and capital as property), this generalises and
intensifies competition in relation to the means of production, money capital, specific capitals
as units of competition, and social capital. Derivatives are the most generalised form of this
capacity and, based on the calculation of value-at-risk (VaR), they have a growing role in the
commensuration of all investment opportunities and every single risk in the world market
(Bryan and Rafferty, 2006). In extending and deepening the basis for hedging and financial
speculation, derivatives play a key role in the tendential completion of the world market by
transforming future income streams (profit, dividend, or interest) into tradable assets, and also
change the dynamics of competition on a world scale (Table 5).
Noting the arguments of Marx and Engels in The German Ideology (1979) on the limits to
world market integration, we could say that derivatives as forms of financial innovation
integrate production on a world scale, for they tend to:
 
• Overcome the frictions of national boundaries;
• Open national economies to foreign competition;
• Help to overcome the clumsiness of production; and
• Enhance the role of finance in promoting competition.
 
Thus, in so far as derivatives promote the completion of the world market, they also serve to
activate ‘all the contradictions’ of capital accumulation (see Marx 1976b; 1973; and Marx and
Engels 1976).
Financial innovation has vastly increased the amount of leverage in the system. Contrary
to Minsky’s view that households relied on hedge finance to sustain their consumption and to
purchase housing, it has enabled them to engage in speculative and Ponzi borrowing on a
massive aggregate scale – encouraged to do so through lenders’ new-found ability to
securitise these loans and offload their risks. Among other effects, these “financial weapons
of mass destruction” (Buffett, 2003: 16) multiply the volume of opaque, highly leveraged,
largely unregulated financial transactions. This overwhelms the capacity of central banks to
act as lender of last resort and/or has prompted the socialisation of toxic assets at fictitious
prices (compared to their mark-to-market valuation) and the transformation of private Ponzi
debt into public and/or sovereign debt. This has changed the forms of appearance of the crisis
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and the allocation of its costs and consequences, but it has not resolved the potential for crisis
in capitalism, notwithstanding Greenspan’s views on the efficient market hypothesis and the
self-interest of financial institutions in prudential activities to avoid putting their capital and
social reputation at risk through control fraud, speculation, Ponzi finance, and ‘unusual deals
with political authority’ (see Jessop, 2013b). The expansion of these markets (especially when
hidden in shadow banking activities or conducted offshore) means that they now dwarf the
role of financial intermediation and risk-management, and therefore play a pro-cyclical, heavily
de-stabilising role via financial speculation and risk-taking by highly leveraged financial
institutions (see Broadbent, 2011; Haldane and Alessandri, 2009). It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that they played a crucial role in the NAFC and its global repercussions, inflating the
financial bubble to a degree unimaginable to the layperson and hard to calculate even for
experts.4
In addition, derivatives take the fetish-like character of fictitious capital to new heights
because they have even less relation than interest-bearing capital to the movement of real
values. Indeed these forms of fictitious capital provide the basis for new fictitious commodities
(derivatives treated as commodities), new forms of fictitious money (based on securitisation),
new forms of fictitious banking capital (for example, more or less rarefied CDOs), and new
forms of share capital (for example, credit derivatives product companies, special investment
vehicles). These developments are consistent with Marx’s unfolding, but never completed,
analysis of fictitious commodities, fictitious money, and fictitious capital. But they take them to
more rarefied, insane, and irrational heights (think CDO3 and, indeed, so-called CDOn).
Underpinning these developments is, as McNally notes:
[an] attempt to create something called abstract risk that can be measured and sold. This is what derivative
markets do, they buy and sell risk exposures … The assumption built into it is something inherent in the
value abstraction – the idea that all these risks are commensurable and equitable. This is what exploded,
as it had to, because it carries all the inherent contradictions of the value form – the contradictions
between the concrete actual processes of social organisation of life activities within capitalism and the
value form. (McNally, 2011: 115)
Before this explosion, however, and, indeed, afterwards, these developments also modify the
forms of competition. Derivatives reinforce the separation between the general movement of
capital based on valorisation and the fluctuation of money prices and profit and, in this way,
facilitate financialisation and the rise of finance-dominated accumulation. The disembedding
of financial capital and the extension of neo-liberalism tend to make financialisation the
primary basis of differential accumulation and to produce finance-dominated accumulation
regimes in which “profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than
through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 2005: 174; see also Jessop, 2013b). The
logic of financialisation (wherever it occurs) transforms the role of finance from its
conventionally-defined, if always crisis-prone, intermediary function in the circuit of capital to a
more dominant role oriented to rent extraction through financial arbitrage and innovation. It is
through the expansion of derivatives, initially for risk management – but, following Haldane
(2012), creating opportunities thereby for financial speculation and risk-taking – that the
contradictions of the value form find new or intensified expressions. This reflects the
paradoxical role of derivatives in risk management, crisis-transmission, and crisis-
management in the sense that, as many have recently observed, the micro-level security
offered through securitisation creates macro-level insecurity (e.g. Amato and Fantacci, 2011).
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Conclusions
Concluding remarks are not the place for a detailed analysis of the genesis, aetiology, and
path of the NAFC. This said, it can be summarised as a crisis triggered by growing problems
rooted in a hypertrophied finance-dominated economy in which fictitious money, fictitious
credit, fictitious capital (and, increasingly, fictitious profits derived from control fraud in various
financial institutions) played an increasingly autonomous role in economic dynamics. The over-
accumulation of interest-bearing capital enabled by its dissociation from, and indifference to,
other moments of the capital relation was a crucial factor in the eventual bursting of financial
bubbles around the world. Such bubbles have occurred before, of course, but the present
crisis has a more specific, intense form due to the hyper-financialisation of advanced
neoliberal economies and, notably, to practices of de-regulated, opaque, and sometimes
fraudulent financial institutions that benefit from a corrupt relation with political authority. This
created, as eventually it was bound to do, the implosion of the financial bubble, creating the
conditions for debt-default-deflation dynamics. This evolved stepwise as the US crisis passed
through stages: credit crunch, liquidity crisis, some financial insolvencies, a generalised
financial crisis, a recession that risked becoming an epic recession or even great depression,
and, most recently, a ‘public debt’ crisis. A similar trajectory is found in the UK. It is in these
circumstances that the shift from the largely unregulated extension of easy credit is
transformed into the scramble for hard cash.
The crisis of finance-dominated accumulation regimes in the UK and USA did not produce
a crisis of neoliberalism. Indeed, the only example of this is Iceland, where the weight of the
hypertrophied financial sector was even more excessive than in the UK, and where radical
measures were taken to impose the costs of crisis-management on financial capital (Cyprus
came later as part of the Eurozone crisis). In the two Anglo-Saxon economies, however, while
financial capital may have lost some credibility, it remained dominant in the accumulation
regime, in the state apparatus, and, for the USA, in the legislature. It could therefore exploit
the crisis, making sure that it did not, in Rahm Emanuel’s terms, ‘go to waste’. Where finance-
dominated accumulation drives economic expansion and financial capital is a significant part
of the economy (and strongly interconnected with other sectors), financial crisis becomes a
source of problems that must be addressed to restore the logic of accumulation. If financial
capital is well-entrenched in the state apparatus, then the capacity to rescue ‘too big to fail’
financial institutions also exists when states can create fiat money and engage in other credit
manoeuvres to socialise toxic assets and losses. And when financial capital is also dominant
in the power bloc, it can manoeuvre to delay, dilute, and otherwise weaken attempts to re-
regulate its operations. The costs for this are transferred to the state and this, in turn, provides
the opportunity (also not to be allowed to go to waste) of doubling up on the neoliberal
vilification of the state, to cut entitlement programmes, and roll out further austerity
measures.
In short, a crisis of finance-dominated accumulation has been transformed into a drawn-
out crisis in finance-dominated accumulation. This was possible because the neoliberal
project experienced only a temporary crisis in its onward march. Given the continued
dominance of interest-bearing capital in the two advanced economies that had undergone the
most radical neoliberal regime shifts (the USA and the UK), the response to the NAFC was to
resort to exceptional measures that rescued too-big-to-fail banks rather than providing relief to
households with underwater mortgages and distressed debt and/or supporting profit-
generating capital. This transformed the toxic debt of financial institutions into sovereign debt
and provided the spurious legitimation for austerity measures in which state efforts to reduce
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public deficits have created debt-default-deflation dynamics that impose hard times as
governments impose welfare retrenchment and other austerity measures, leaving households
short of hard cash and with limited opportunities to access easy credit.
Notes
1. On early forms of money and their ties to debt and the state, see Graeber (2010).
2. For a broader discussion of Marx’s theory of money, see Jessop (2013a), de Brunhoff (1976),
Nelson (1999), Lapavitsas (2013), and Moseley (2005).
3. On the affinities between Marx and Minsky, see Crotty (1985).
4. Although there is no central register of derivatives, recent calculations suggest that the total global
stock of notional (non-cleared) derivatives (exercised or not, regardless of term) has reached one
quadrillion USD, which is 20 times global GDP.
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